C
hina's rapid, ongoing development is deeply influencing global patterns of resource production and consumption and their associated environmental and geopolitical impacts. China leads the world in the consumption of grain, meat, coal, and steel-all the major industrial commodities except oil, for which China is second only to the United States (Brown 2006) . The combination of the country's huge population and high rate of sustained economic growth is unprecedented. Yet China's per capita use of important commodities remains low. For example, on average a Chinese citizen uses 3 times less grain and 13 times less oil than a citizen of the United States. Gross domestic product (GDP) is almost 9 times less per capita in China than in the United States, and carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions are almost 7 times less (Flavin and Gardner 2006) .
China and the rest of the rapidly developing world have so far followed the fossil fuel-based economic development model of the West. Given the size of its population and ongoing growth rate, what might be the consequences as per capita consumption in China moves closer to US levels? Even allowing for the historical inaccuracies in Chinese statistics and the uncertainties involved in predicting trends over time, projections are sobering. Assuming that China's population grows to 1.45 billion people (the United Nations median projection) and that its GDP grows by 8% per year, Brown (2006) calculated that at 2004 levels of US per capita consumption, by 2030 China would consume 66% of global grain production, 200% of world paper production, and 118% of current oil production (see also Flavin and Gardner 2006) . China is on track to become the world's largest economy some time between 2025 and 2035, and it will most likely pass the United States in CO 2 emissions around 2010 (EIA 2006) . Given that there are no defensible ethical reasons to deny China (and the rest of the developing world) access to meat, cars, and electricity, what might be the environmental consequences if these trend projections are accurate?
China's emergence is a complex phenomenon. By "emergence," I refer to a suite of indicators: standard measures of GDP growth and domestic per capita income, creation of a rapidly expanding consumer class, building of industrial infrastructure, and development of regional and international political authority. Taken together, these factors have dramatically boosted China's economic stature and geopolitical influence. In the following analysis, I highlight several key drivers and constraints that are likely to influence China's ongoing rise. I spotlight domestic and international issues that will certainly affect trend outcomes. The reader may note multiple, synergistic links within and between these factors. Finally, I offer some observations about China and the future of global sustainability that may serve as a basis for action in the short term to secure long-term future prospects.
Three key drivers of China's rise
The sheer scale of China, which is the most populous country in human history and continues to sustain rapid economic growth, is the single most important development driver. Polanyi (1957) described the 20th century's "great transformation" of much of the world to a commercial, industrial, urban society, but it may be that the present century will see more development than the past. The rapidly developing countries comprise 57% of Earth's people, with China accounting for 34.7% of their numbers (PRB 2003) . Development is certainly not over; in fact, it is gaining speed. In 2005, for example, newly built office space in Shanghai surpassed the total area of all existing commercial space in New York City (Barboza 2005) .
Urbanization, one example of a scale-influenced driver, is rapidly transforming China in four important ways. First, arable land is being lost to new construction. Since 2001, 2.7% of all arable land in China has been paved over (Liu Y 2006a) . Given that China already has 40% less arable land per capita than the global average, this directly affects domestic food security, with the potential to influence global commodity markets. Second, urban Chinese consume 3.5 times more energy than their rural counterparts, and the rate of urbanization is fast increasing (Liu Y 2006b) . Third, average household size is decreasing across China, creating a positive feedback loop in which more houses are required for the same number of people (Liu and Diamond 2005) . By 2030 (without factoring in expected population growth), 250 million new homes will be needed, more than existed in 2000 in all of the Western Hemisphere. Last, increases in the scale of urbanization are dramatically reducing natural vegetation and increasing nonnative species in and around rapidly developing "city clusters" (Shao et al. 2006 , Zhao et al. 2006 ). This trend is expected to continue, as planners predict that by 2020 about 50% of all Chinese, 600 million to 700 million people, will live in cities (Shao et al. 2006) .
The policies of the People's Republic of China (PRC) are a second key driver of China's rise. The PRC policy with the most profound impact was the 1978 decision to abandon Maoism and open the country to market forces. This decision continues to shape China's current growth trajectory with a mix of marketization and state intervention. Despite rhetoric to the contrary and the potential for change, PRC policies still favor economic growth over environmental protection. For example, party incentives at the lower levels of government (township, county, province) remain tied to economic, not environmental, targets (Lieberthal 1997) .
Energy policy provides another example of the PRC's focus on growth. Between 2005 and 2020, the goal is to quadruple GDP while energy use doubles (Aldhous 2005) . Coal would continue to be China's primary energy source, with serious implications for domestic air quality and ecosystem impacts and for international CO 2 emissions. Only after 2035 would renewable sources play an important role in China's energy mix.
Finally, though the Three Gorges Dam and the Yangtze River water diversion projects are well known, the largest PRC development project is the Western Development Strategy (Shen 2004 , Tian 2004 . As a result of a complex history of borderland conflict and ethnic minority politics, combined with past government policies that favored economic growth in eastern China, regional disparities have become a source of domestic political instability.
The government response is "Go West," a campaign to build infrastructure (roads, rail lines, dams, and power grids) to bring western China into the economic mainstream. However, the likely environmental impacts of China's western development vision, to be achieved over 20 years, are similar in scale to US development of the American West in the first seven decades of the 20th century. The PRC plans to build 900,000 km of roads throughout rural China by 2010 (Xin 2006) . Hydropower development in Yunnan province, a locus of temperate-zone biodiversity in China and the world (Yang et al. 2004) , calls for up to 33 dams with a combined capacity over 2.5 times greater than that of the Three Gorges Dam (Dore and Yu 2004, Magee 2006) . "Go West" projects are also linked directly with regionwide development. Seven new rail lines and four large-scale highways connecting China with Central Asian countries are under construction or in advanced stages of planning (Garver 2006) . Russia and China are planning the construction of at least one large oil pipeline and two natural gas lines. The two countries are also negotiating an electricity pact with attendant new transmission lines so that Russia can boost delivery to China from the current 900 million kilowatt-hours (kWh) to 18 billion kWh per year (Pan 2006) . Further afield, China is providing funding, labor, and engineering expertise to Pakistan and Bangladesh for two huge port complexes on the Indian Ocean for the transshipment of oil and other goods (Haider 2005) .
Globalization is a third key driver. China surpassed the United States as the primary locus of foreign direct investment in 2002 (Diamond 2005) . The country's recent accession to the World Trade Organization will reduce trade barriers, a process that is still gathering speed. China, the "factory of the world," currently depends on its export economy, and so growth is connected to the purchasing power of the developed world. As China urbanizes and its middle class grows and gains spending power, the domestic economy will begin to rival the export economy.
To summarize, China's size and economic growth rate combine with PRC policies and globalization to create powerful stimuli for continued rapid growth. Every year since 2001, in fact, China's GDP growth has surpassed projections (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003, Bradsher 2006) . Given that China's domestic economy is only beginning to mature, it is entirely possible that the country could maintain current high growth rates for decades. But there are powerful influences that may constrain China's rise.
Constraints on China's growth
The key constraints on China's rise and its concomitant impacts are domestic and regional environmental degradation (especially soil and water issues), political instability, coal and oil consumption, and rising CO 2 emissions. Environmental degradation in China is well known (see Economy 2004, Liu and Diamond 2005) . Here I focus specifically on soil impacts, water pollution, and the increasing importance of loss of biodiversity.
Agricultural land is at a premium in China; only Egypt and Bangladesh have less arable land per capita (Smil 2004 ). Yet urbanization (discussed above), desertification, soil erosion, and salinization are further reducing productive land area. At the same time, the burgeoning middle class is eating more grain-fed meat, and the overall population is expanding at a rate of about 10 million people per year. Projections suggest that China's grain imports will nevertheless hold steady at about 20 million metric tons per year through 2020 (Huang et al. 1999) . These data, however, are subject to two major uncertainties: the potential impacts of rising temperatures and altered precipitation patterns on crop yields as a result of global warming, and the continued positive yield responses to the world's highest application rates of nitrogenous fertilizers.
Water availability and quality may be the two most problematic constraints on China's future development. Demand across all sectors is moving beyond a sustainable supply. Eighty-five percent of arable land in the North China Plain, the country's breadbasket, is groundwater irrigated, yet aquifers are being overdrawn (Brown 2006) . Residential and industrial demand is increasing rapidly. If trends continue (using 2000 as a baseline), by 2020 domestic water demand will double, industrial use will increase 1.5 times, and domestic sewage discharge will increase by at least a factor of 1.3 (Shao et al. 2006) . Water quality is also compromised. Much of the water in five of the seven largest rivers in China is too polluted to be safely touched by humans (Economy 2004) . A 2001 World Bank report described the country's water situation as "catastrophic." More recent analyses, factoring in potential climate change, suggest that while water availability may increase or decrease from basin to basin, overall yield trends remain negative (Kirshen et al. 2005) . In China's west, the reduction of glaciers looms large. The Chinese Academy of Sciences predicts that by 2050, 64% of the ice on the Tibetan Plateau will have melted, in a region where 300 million people depend on water from this source (UNEP 2005 , Lean 2006 .
Of course, nonhuman species also rely on China's waters. China is a country of "megadiversity."Approximately 12% of vascular plants, 15% of mammals, 14% of birds, and 18% of fishes on Earth are found in China (table 1; SEPA 1998) . The PRC, however, has a history of discounting environmental impacts (Shapiro 2001) . Despite a plethora of environmental laws and policies, protecting biodiversity still ranks well below economic development (Xu and Melick 2007) . This may be changing. China's richest concentrations of plant genera and terrestrial mammals, including many endemic and endangered species, are generally located in the undeveloped west (Yang et al. 2004 . As government-sponsored development accelerates, with little cumulative assessment of habitat fragmentation, wildlife corridors, and other ecological issues, public concern is mounting. Concern about biodiversity loss is not constrained by national borders. Dams proposed for the Mekong River in Yunnan would alter downstream flow regimes, food production, and deforestation throughout the six-country Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), a world center for freshwater crab and fish diversity and endemic gastropods (Dudgeon 2000 , Roberts 2001 , Dore and Yu 2004 . In 2004, in response to national and international protest, Premier Wen Jiabao took the unprecedented step of declaring a moratorium on dams on Yunnan's Nu River (Yeung and Turner 2006) . In 2006, leaders of the six GMS countries announced a plan to create the first wildlife corridors in Asia (Bezlova 2006) .
But "Go West" plans, combined with the abovementioned regional energy links, represent infrastructural development on a scale never seen before in Central Asia. The track record for energy projects in the region is poor (Vilcheck and Bykova 1992, Pearce 1997) . It is known that several national parks, a World Heritage site, reindeer migration routes, a core source population of snow leopard, and huge areas of currently unfragmented forests would be affected (Koropachinsky 1996 , Pelkki et al. 2001 . It remains to be seen what role biodiversity conservation will play in constraining development across China and the greater region.
Political instability, a second major constraint on China's rise, is anathema to the PRC because it is perceived as a primary threat to the government's power (Terrill 2005 , Lum 2006 ). To put this statement into perspective, consider the following: PRC policies favoring coastal development have created a wealth gap between eastern (primarily urban) and western (primarily rural) China. Rural incomes in 2004 averaged less than one-third of urban incomes. Because urban incomes are also rising at twice the rate of rural incomes, this problem is not likely to go away soon (Yu 2005 Source: SEPA 1998 , Yang et al. 2004 Will such disparities constrain growth? Demonstrations against the PRC government numbered 87,000 in 2005, a 58% increase over two years (Li 2006 , Lum 2006 . Most of these protests resulted from illegal land seizures from villagers by corrupt local government, coupled with inadequate channels for legal redress. With populations in flux, economic growth paramount, land tenure less than transparent, and governmental authority decentralized, it is easy for local officials to disregard the law (Sun 2005) . Land tenure issues also undermine many aspects of environmental planning. There can be no effective, long-term pollution control or protected area management (to name but two problems) in China without first resolving issues of jurisdictional authority, rights of property control, and consistent application of the rule of law.
China's one-child-per-family population policy has unexpectedly created another social constraint. In a country where male children are culturally favored, rates of selective female abortion and infanticide have been driving up the overall ratio of males to females. While this ratio has fluctuated historically, the overall trend since 1980 has been upward (Baochang and Roy 1995) . Demographic data suggest that within 20 years, there may be up to 33 million Chinese males with no prospect of having wives, a situation that history shows leads to social unrest (Hudson and den Boer 2004 ).
China's population is also aging rapidly. By 2030, 24% of all citizens will be 60 or older, and China is likely to face a social security crisis (Crane et al. 2005 , Hussain 2005 ). Though the PRC instituted a mandatory pension system in 1986, it has never been funded properly. Estimates of what the government owes to workers in future benefits range up to an astounding 85% of current GDP (Frazier 2006) .
Beyond potential domestic environmental and social brakes on development, there are two additional (and related) constraints with explicit geopolitical dimensions: increasing use of coal and oil, and rising CO 2 emissions. It is important to realize that China's energy demand is just now taking off. The country is still in the early stages of industrialization. China's national energy strategy uses three scenarios to project future fossil fuel consumption (DRC 2004) . Using the leastconsumption scenario, despite a dramatic decline in per capita energy use since 1980, by 2020 coal use is expected to rise 61% over 2000 levels. The burning of coal already accounts for 70% of CO 2 , 90% of sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ), and 67% of nitrogen oxide (NO x ) emissions in China. Extending the least-consumption scenario to 2020, SO 2 levels are projected to increase 150% beyond what Chinese experts describe as the maximum capacity for the entire country. Sulfur dioxide emissions in 2004 were already at levels that had been projected for 2010, with 30% of China's land area subject to acidification and its associated ecological impacts. Though acidification's biological impacts are well studied in Europe and the United States, little research has been conducted in China (Larssen et al. 1999 , Tao et al. 2002 , Phoenix et al. 2006 . As for NO x levels, projections to 2020 are for an 86% increase.Yet this forecast does not explicitly include emissions from automobiles, which are a primary source of NO x . Further significant air pollution impacts appear unavoidable.
The geopolitical twist to intensive coal development is that none of the resultant pollutants remain wholly within China's airshed. Japan and South Korea are already affected by Chinese-generated pollutants, and SO 2 and NO x are showing up on the West Coast of North America (Bradsher and Barboza 2006) . Research from southern California suggests that on some days 25% of airborne particulates originate from China, with as yet unknown consequences (Chea 2006) .
Oil consumption, too, is likely to constrain China's growth, and in unpredictable ways. The PRC is as concerned as the United States is about energy independence. Yet oil imports have risen from 0% in 1993 to about 43% today, with 2020 projections up to 63%-70% (Downs 2004) . And, like the rest of the world, China will increasingly depend on Middle Eastern sources over the coming decades. China's pursuit of secure oil supplies has been in the news recently, and American portrayals of the country's behavior have not been positive. Two points provide perspective on this complex topic. First, China is late to the game of purchasing oil on the world market from large (and often American-owned) corporations that already have long-term allocation contracts in place. Second, until the aforementioned energy infrastructure projects are completed in 5 to 10 years, the majority of China's oil will continue to be shipped through two primary sea lanes, both subject to control by the US Navy (Lieberthal and Herberg 2006) .
The last constraint on China's rise may be the most important of all: CO 2 emissions. There has been ongoing debate within the PRC as to whether to look upon burning coal primarily as a domestic concern, affecting local air quality and human health, or as a cause of international global warming. But with domestic CO 2 emissions projected to increase more than 300% from 2003 to 2030 (EIA 2006 ), Chinese energy experts see the time fast approaching when the country's emissions will be so large that it will no longer be able to draw on any bargaining position as a "developing country" (table 2; DRC 2004) . In fact, the most recent projections have moved up by 15 years (to 2010) the time when China will surpass the United States as the world's largest emitter (EIA 2005 (EIA , 2006 . This increase would swamp all projected reductions from Kyoto signatory countries over the same period (Bradsher and Barboza 2006, EIA 2006) . Given the discussion about "dangerous levels" of climate change (O'Neill and Oppenheimer Source : EIA 2006. 2002, Keller et al. 2005) , such increases are a cause of international concern.
Acommodating China and global sustainability
There is a Chinese proverb: "When an arrow is on a string, it must go." Despite trend data uncertainties, the question is not "Will China rise?" but how much and at what cost to the country and the rest of the world. If it is clear that the world cannot accommodate two "carbon emissions superpowers" without increasing the risks of unacceptable climate impacts, then the sheer magnitude of China's emergence represents a tipping point between 20th-century, fossil fuel-based development and still-emergent, 21st-century sustainable alternatives. Simply stated, if the stabilization of CO 2 emissions is predicated on the 1.5% annual increase of the past 30 years, then a projected 2.75% increase over the coming 24 years on the part of China and the United States is problematic (Pacala and Socolow 2004) . CO 2 emission control could be the specific driver that leads nations toward a more sustainable future. China cannot expect to accomplish this transition, however, without greater assistance from the wealthy industrial countries. The history and internal party politics of the PRC; pressures to continue economic growth in order to further increase per capita income, reduce poverty, and maintain political stability; and the fact that China still lacks technical capacity while depending on antiquated industrial infrastructure argue for this. The following observations suggest ways to facilitate cooperation between China and the developed world.
It is true that much technology already exists to ease the world away from fossil fuel dependence, but the greater truth is that technologies are always deployed in political arenas. Global transitions of this magnitude depend on leadership. In China, the PRC is exerting strong leadership. The government recognizes that domestic energy consumption from now through 2020 could be reduced by a quarter if less coal is burned and efficiencies in the burgeoning transportation and building sectors are enhanced. To accomplish this, the PRC has passed national legislation in renewable energy development (wind, solar, and biofuel), backed by $180 billion in funding; vehicle taxes designed to keep high-consumption vehicles such as SUVs out of the domestic market; and strict emission controls, fuel economy standards, and bus rapid transit system requirements. All of these laws surpass current US mandates. In late 2006, the PRC released data that represent the first attempt by any country to account for environmental costs in GDP calculation (Liu J 2006) . Nevertheless, the task of "greening" China is daunting. The PRC's investment in energy efficiency as a percentage of GDP has fallen since the 1980s (Sinton et al. 2005) . This is an example of how the rate and scale of Chinese growth swamp efficiency and is a prime reason why China must have greater international financial and technical assistance.
This leads to the role of the United States in China's emergence. In a globalizing world, China's export economy is fueled by developed-world investment and consumer demand, even as the PRC finances US debt. Wealthy industrial countries are fully implicated in China's ascendancy. Despite these links, the last two US administrations have had no coherent policy toward China (Frank 1997 , Engdahl 2006 , Mahbubani 2006 . In fact, the energy security goals of the two countries run parallel. Energy nationalism by either country solves no problems. This insight is leading many in the US policy community toward agreement on engaging China so that the country becomes "embedded" in the international community (Downs 2004 , Klare 2006 , Leverett and Bader 2005 . Instead of branding China as a "problem," US leaders, as an initial step, could help China secure membership in the International Energy Agency and invite the country into multilateral talks with emission reduction targets as a primary goal. Much capacity building with an emphasis on energy efficiency has already been accomplished by US and other international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working with China (see Bruce et al. 2004 , Wang et al. 2004 , Sinton et al. 2005 . These efforts, with their advocacy of a broad mix of supply price reforms, demand-side management, and government-backed incentives, are models for engaging China on internal problems. There also exist comprehensive NGO analyses on engaging China internationally (Bustelo 2005, Lieberthal and Herberg 2006) .
But NGOs can accomplish only so much. It is time for the US government to consider adopting federal policies to speed energy-related technology transfer and cooperation between the two countries, especially in the areas of coal liquefaction and gasification, polygeneration, carbon sequestration, and green building design. Efficient irrigation systems and nitrogenous fertilizer production and application could also be fruitful areas for collaboration. These recommendations break little new ground; they merely need to become US policy goals. The Energy Diplomacy and Security Act introduced in the US Senate in March 2006, which would mandate formal energy coordination with China (and India), seems to represent a step in the right direction. A problem that few US politicians are willing to tackle is that reducing American energy profligacy is the other half of the "assist China" equation. Assuming a two-term president in office through 2016, management of the threats discussed in this article demands that the next US leader be an advocate for engaging China (and American citizens) on the issues discussed above.
Policy precedents set with China in the next decade or so may well determine the future course of global sustainability. While China has 300 million new consumers, there are 756 million more in the rest of the rapidly developing world (Myers and Kent 2004) . India is projected to pass China as the world's fastest-growing economy by 2020. Global geopolitical fault lines are shifting. Interrelationships have always been foundational to the science of ecology, but in foreign policy, as David Lampton (2005) observes, "interdependence is not something the US does to others; rather, it is a relation that simultaneously constrains the US as it constrains others." China's rise and its associated impacts are pushing the world toward a political multipolarity and a reckoning with energy sustainability-or a very uncertain future.
